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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THELMA B. STANTON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE "NO. 14268

JAMES LAWRENCE STANTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF .

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Thelma B. Stanton, plaintiff and respondent herein,
respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing, on the
following grounds:
1.

The court's decision evades the mandate of the

United States Supreme Court and violates the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI, United States Constitution.
2.

The majority of the court failed to follow the law

of the case as established in the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
3.

The court ignored the stipulation of the parties as
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to the issue to be determined in this appeal.
4.

The court incorrectly assumed that the legislature

had set the age of majority for purposes of support in
divorce proceedings.
5.

The court incorrectly described the original decree

as providing for support of "minor" children.
6*

The court's reversal and remand deprives plaintiff-

respondent of costs awarded to her by the United States
Supreme Court.
7.

Justice Ellett should have disqualified himself in

this case.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
NATURE OF CASE
This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County awarding plaintiff-respondent $2,700, interest, and costs, by virtue of child support that had accrued
after the parties1 daughter had attained the age of 18 years.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
The court in its decision on appeal held that the child
support obligation of the defendant, James Lawrence Stanton,
ended when his daughter reached the age of 18 years.

The

court refused to decide the age of majority that applies
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to both males and females in divorce proceedings.

It reversed

the judgment of the trial court and awarded costs to defendantappellant,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 29, 1960, Honorable A. H. Ellett, then Judge
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, entered a Decree of
Divorce which awarded to Mrs. Stanton the care and custody
of the parties1 two children, and contained the following
provision with respect to support and alimony:
Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff
the sum of $300 per month as child support and
alimony, $100 per month for each child as child
support and $100 per month as alimony, to be
paid on or before the first day of each month
through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.
On May 22, 1973, Mrs. Stanton filed a motion for entry
of judgment against Mr. Stanton for $2,700 which represented
support money for their daughter since her 18th birthday.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that 15-2-1
Utah Code Annotated 1953 set the age of majority for females
at 18 years, and that the support obligation for the daughter
terminated on her 18th birthday.

This court upheld the

trial court's ruling in Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315,
517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
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Mrs. Stanton appealed the decision to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and on April 15f 1975, that court reversed the judgment, holding that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953, in the context of divorce decreed support obligations,
was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the
laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct.

1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975).

In deciding the matter, the

United States Supreme Court first disposed of the contentions
that the support issue was moot and that Mrs. Stanton lacked
standing, then said:
We therefore conclude that under any test—
compelling state interests, or rational basis,
or something in between—§15-2-1, in the context of child support, does not survive an
equal protection attack. In that context, no
valid distinction between male and female may
be drawn.
The court then held that a determination of the cige of majority
for the purposes of divorce support obligations was a matter
for the Utah courts and remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
This court refused to decide the case when first remanded by the United States Supreme Court, and sent it to
the District Court of Salt Lake County for further proceedings.

- 4 -
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In the district court the parties stipulated "that the only
matter for resolution was whether, in the context of divorcedecreed child support obligations, children attain their
majority at age 18 or at age 21", and that the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment if the age of majority is 21 years.
The district court decided that for purposes of child
support, children attain their majority at age 21, granted
plaintifffs motion, and entered judgment for $2,700 past-due
support money, $508.80 interest, and $437.38 awarded to her
as costs by the United States Supreme Court.
This court reversed, holding that the establishment of
the age of majority is a matter for the legislature.

It

refused to rule that a single age of majority applied to
both men and women, taking the position that Mrs. Stanton
did not have standing to raise the question with respect to
male children.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT'S DECISION EVADES THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT AND VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF
ARTICLE VI, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
In the first appeal of this case, Stanton v. Stanton, 36
Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974), this court rejected Mrs.
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Stanton's contention that the application of different ages
to male and female children for the purposes of divorce-decreed
support violates the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed
by Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.

The court took

the position that the classification was reasonable, that the
statute was not unconstitutional, and that if any change was
made in the age of support the change should be made by the
legislature.

The difference between males and females was

thought sufficient to justify different treatment for purposes
of divorce support.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court said (at
421 U.S. 14-16) :
The test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between children warrants the
distinction in the appellee's obligation to
support that is drawn by the Utah statute.
We conclude that it does not. It may be true,
as the Utah court observed and is argued here,
that it is the man's primary responsibility to
provide a home and that it is salutary for him
to have education and training before he assumes
that responsibility; that girls tend to mature
earlier than boys; and that females tend to
marry earlier than males. The last mentioned
factor, however, under the Utah statute loses
whatever weight it might otherwise have, for
the statute states that "all minors obtain
their majority by marriage"; thus minority,
and all that goes with it, is abruptly lost by
marriage of a person of either sex at whatever
tender age the marriage occurs.
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Notwithstanding the "old notions" to which
the Utah court referred, we perceive nothing rational in the distinction drawn by §15-2-1 which,
when related to the divorce decree, results in
the appellee's liability for support for Sherri
only to age 18 but for Rick to age 21. This imposes "criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that statute." A child male or female, is
still a child. No longer is a female destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace in the world
of ideas. [Citation omitted.] Women's activities
and responsibilities are increasing and expanding.
Coeduation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence
of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary,
antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental
support while he attains his education and training,
so, too, it is for the girl. To distinguish between
the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving:
if the female is not to be supported so long as the
male, she hardly can be expected to attend school
as long as he does, and bringing her education to an
end earlier coincides with the role typing society
has long imposed. And if any weight remains in this
day to the claim of earlier maturity of the female,
with the concomitant inference of absence of need
for support beyond 18, we fail to perceive its
unquestioned truth or its significance, particularly
when marriage, as the statute provides, terminates
minority for a person of either sex.
* * * *

We therefore, conclude that under any test—
compelling state interest, or rational basis, or
something in between—§15-2-1, in the context of
child support, does not survive an equal protection attack. In that context, no valid distinction between male and female may be drawn.
* * * *
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The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is
reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Notwithstanding the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, the majority of this court walked the same
ground again.

It held that it was the function of the

legislature to make a determination as to the age of majority,
just as it had before.

It reiterated its view that a statute

is presumed to be valid unless it clearly appears to be in
conflict with some provision of the Constitution, notwithstanding 3. direct holding by the United States Supreme Court that
the statute is unconstitutional.
This court said:
If in a proper case it could be held that it is
a denial of the equal protection of the law to
recognize that there is a difference in age when
the sex is mature, would it not also be a denial
of equal protection to enable a female to marry
at age 14 while the male in order to marry must
be 16?
This amounts to a clear rejection of the power of the
United States Supreme Court to make a determination, as it
did in this case, that the statute in question was unconstitutional in the context of divorce decreed support obligations.
It may be true, as the majority opinion says, that "to
judicially hold that males and females attain their maturity
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at the same age is to be blind to the biological facts of
life," but is also true that to judicially hold that this
court has the power to overrule a determination of the
Supreme Court of the United States is to be "blind" to the
historical and political facts of life*
One of the concurring opinions takes issue with the
mandate of the United States Supreme Court saying that the
direction that the matter should be resolved by the Utah
courts, "historically has not been considered as an acceptable
legal concept by our state juridicary."
And the majority opinion states that "the oath we took
when chosen as justices of the Supreme Court of Utah forbids
us to encroach on the duties and functions of the legislature*"
We have looked in vain for any such "forbidding" in the oath
of office prescribed for public officers in Article IV, Section 10, Utah Constitution:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support, obey and defend the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of this
state, and that I will discharge the duties of
my office with fidelity.
The Constitution of the United States, which the justices
of the Supreme Court swear to uphold, includes the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI:
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis added.)
For 160 years it has been settled law that this Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution operates on the
judiciary as well as upon the legislature, and that state
courts are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court
with respect to interpretations of federal law.

Martin v.

Hunter*s Lessee, 1 Wheat 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816).
This court seems purposely to have evaded the mandate
of the United States Supreme Court. Although directed to
determine the age at which divorce-decreed support obligations
end for both males and females the court has refused to
carry out the mandate of the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, it has left the "equal protection" question just
where it found it.

The court majority holds that support ob-

ligations for females end at age 18, saying that it is not
necessary to make a determination for males.

In doing this

it relies upon some propositions that were regarded as invalid
by the United States Supreme Court, as is pointed out in the
argument below.
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II
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF
THE CASE AS ESTABLISHED IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES.
Before the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Stanton
took the positions that the support issue was moot because
at the time of the argument the daughter had reached the age
of 21 years; and that Mrs. Stanton lacked standing to raise
the equal protection issue under the Constitution of the
United States. Both of these arguments were explicitly
rejected.
Additionally, it was argued that because of a stipulation
that was entered into by the parties with respect to the
decree to be entered in the case, there was somehow an agreement that support would end for the daughter when she achieved
the age of 18 years. This was also rejected, the United
States Supreme Court saying:
We see nothing in the stipulation itself that
is directed to the question when majority is
reached for purposes of support payments or
that smacks of waiver.
Notwithstanding these holdings by the United States
Supreme Court, this court took contrary positions.

It stated

that the statute holding girls attain their majority at age
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18 was constitutional, contrary to the United States Supreme
Courte

It held that the "constitutionality of the statute

can be raised only by one who had an interest in the lawsuit,"
and stated that neither of the parties in this case had an
interest in the lawsuit, also contrary to the holding of the
United States Supreme Court.

It held that the "judge and

the parties to this proceeding all assumed that the decree
meant that the 'father should furnish the support for the son
until he reached 21 and for the daughter until she reached
age 18, 1 " again contrary to the holding of the United States
Supreme Court with respect to the stipulation.
In short, the majority decision is an act of judicial
muscle flexing aimed at demonstrating to the United States
Supreme Court that the Supreme Court of Utah is free to make
its own lawr unfettered by the federal judiciary.,

In carry-

ing out the demonstration it has lost sight of its duty to
the litigants and the rule of law.
Ill
THE COURT IGNORED THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AS
TO THE ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED IN THIS APPEAL.
In advocating equity, one of the concurring judges correctly observed that this is a controversy between two parties,
but having so observed, disregarded the issues tried by those
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parties and suggested the application of "equity and good conscience" to decide the case*
But the defendant did not appear as his own counsel.
He was well represented, and in the district court the
parties stipulated that the only issue in the case was
whether the age of majority was 18 or 21. No equitable
questions were raised or decided, and no equitable questions
are before this court.
If "equity" is a factor, the court should consider the
lack of equity in requiring a litigant to go to the United
States Supreme Court twice in order to enforce a legitimate
claim to $2,700.
IV
THE COURT INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAD
SET THE AGE OF MAJORITY FOR PURPOSES OF SUPPORT IN DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS.
In the majority opinion and in one of the concurrences
it is emphasized and re-emphasized that setting of the age of
majority for the purposes of this action is a task for the
legislature and not for the courts. The statement is patently
wrong.
There is nothing in the divorce statutes which prescribes

- 13 -
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the age at which child support money cease.

It is provided

in 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
When a Decree of Divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the
maintenance of the parties and children, as
may be equitable. * * *
Barely six months before the decision in this case, this
court considered the interpretation of "children" as used in
the divorce statute, and in Dehm v. Dehm/ 545 P.2d 525 (Utah
1976) stated:
Since the term "children" has been neither limited
nor defined by the legislature in Section 30-3-5,
a court in a divorce proceeding has the authority
to order support for "children" so long as there is
a legal duty on the part of the parents to so provide.
Understandably, the court in this case made no reference
to Dehm v. Dehm, although the decision was pointed out to the
court in both the brief and in oral argument.
The age at which support begins and ends in divorce
proceedings is and always has been judge-made law, and the
court abdicated its responsibility in attempting to attribute
the problem to the legislature.
V
THE COURT INCORRECTLY DESCRIBED THE ORIGINAL DECREE AS
PROVIDING FOR SUPPORT OF "MINOR" CHILDREN.
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In the majority opinion, Justice Ellett states that
under the original Decree of Divorce the defendant was ordered
to pay plaintiff $100 per month support payments for each of
the "minor children" of the parties. A like statement is found
in one of the concurring opinions. But the fact is that the
decree with respect to support money did not refer to "minor"
children.

It said:

Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the
sum of $300.00 per month as child support and alimony, $100.00 per month for each child as child
support and $100.00 per month as alimony * * *
The use of this language in the support portion of the
decree is enlightening, inasmuch as in the custody portion of
the decree the court did refer to "minor children."

There

seems to have been a recognition, at that time, that there
was a difference in the age at which parental custody ceases
and the age to which parental support obligations continue.
',. VI ,y
THE COURT'S REVERSAL AND REMAND DEPRIVES PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT OF COSTS AWARDED TO HER BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT.
On May 13, 1975, the United States Supreme Court issued
its mandate to this court, remanding the case "for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this court."
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The

mandate also contained the following paragraph:
IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that Thelma B. Stanton
recover from James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., Four
Hundred Thirty-Seven Dollars and Thirty-Eight Cents
($437.38) for her costs herein expended.
The parties and the trial court all recognized that the
plaintiff and respondent was entitled to recover those
costs, and the costs were included in the judgment of the
court below.

But this court simply reversed the trial court

and awarded costs to the appellant.

It made no provision

for the payment of the costs awarded by the Supreme Court
and to that extent directly overruled the United States
Supreme Court's order.
VII
JUSTICE ELLETT SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF IN THIS
CASE.
At the time the original decree was entered, Justice
Ellett was a judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County;
he heard the divorce and entered the decree.

When the case

was first appealed to this court Justice Ellett disqualified
himself from consideration of the matter, apparently because
of his prior participation.

When the case was again appealed,

counsel assumed that Justice Ellett would disqualify himself
again, but when Justice Ellett took the bench on the day of
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argument it appeared to be too late to raise the question
of disqualification.
Justice Ellett's sitting on the case becomes particularly
important because in the majority opinion Justice Ellett
seems to have become a witness as to occurrences at the trial:
The judge and the parties to this proceeding all
assumed that when the decree stated that the
father should be the one to furnish the support
for the children during their minority it meant
that the father should furnish the support for the
son until he reached 21 and for the daughter until
she reached age 18.
CONCLUSION
When this case was decided by the United States Supreme
Court it was remanded to this court with a clear direction
that the age of majority, in the context of child support in
divorce proceedings, had to be the same for both males and
females.

This court, however, has refused to follow the

direction of the United States Supreme Court and has rejected
points established as the law of the case—standing to sue,
among others.
Not only did this court fail to follow the law as set
down by the United States Supreme Court, it failed to follow
its own precedents with respect to the meaning of "children"
in the divorce code. Moreover, in reversing, it deprived
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plaintiff and respondent of costs to which she was entitled
under any theory of the case.
The court should grant the petition for rehearing, set
the matter for reargument, and affirm the decision of the
District Court of Salt Lake County.

In the rehearing of the

case,' Justice Ellett should disqualify himself because of
his participation as the trial judge.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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